Faith Part II: Definitions and the Alternative of “Faith as Trust”

Last week I introduced the chief problem with conceiving of faith as mere belief. Essentially it boils down to this: faith is volitional (it is a decision) and belief (in large part) is not. Faced with this dilemma one has two options, either: (a) redefine faith in a more volitional manner or (b) retain the definition of faith as belief and admit that faith is not volitional (and that we are held eternally accountable for a “decision” we have no control over).

Faced with this dilemma I have chosen option (b) and will begin pursuing it below. Towards the end of this post I will begin to introduce alternatives to “faith as belief,” but first it is necessary to do some preliminary definitional work.

Definitions and The Humean Model of Action

Language surrounding faith is often multivalent. In order to discuss faith and its components productively it is essential to start with clear definitions. For the purposes of this study the term “belief” will refer to a confidence in the truth of a proposition. Unless otherwise stated, belief will always refer to “belief that” something is true (i.e. corresponds to reality). A belief need not be certain, but it must be more probable than not. To believe that something is true is to think that there is greater than 0.5 (or 50%) probability that it is the case. A brief example will clarify.

Let us suppose that Climacus is at the race track and has two beliefs. Climacus believes that the horses will run today and also that ‘Santa’s Little Helper’ is a 10 to 1 underdog in the seventh race. Climacus’ belief that the horses will run today is fairly straightforward; it has a high probability. Barring a freak electrical storm, the horses will be running. His belief that “Santa’s Little Helper” is a 10 to 1 underdog is not as simple. Strictly speaking, Climacus does not have a ‘10% belief’ that Santa’s Little Helper will win’. Such a low probability belief would be no belief at all. In this case Climacus has a belief that the odds on Santa’s Little Helper are accurate. Let us assume he knows the odds makers and thinks that they are both trustworthy and knowledgeable. Thus, Climacus does not have a belief that Santa’s Little Helper will win, but he does have a moderately strong belief that the odds are accurate.

With this concept of belief in mind we can move to the definition of an action. I will use the Humean model of action, which follows:

Desire + Belief = Action

In this model, desire is analogous to an engine and belief is akin to a steering mechanism. Desire motivates an action (it is a want for some as yet unobtained end), while belief (or beliefs) determines what steps an agent takes to achieve her desired end. It is clear that both elements must be present for an action to follow. I may have a belief that a tree will fall on my house if I chop it down; however, an action will not follow in this case because I have no desire to ruin my roof. Conversely, I may have a desire to fly without mechanical aide, but this desire will not incite me to flap my arms. This is because I have no belief that such flight is possible. An action is a volitional movement motivated by a desire (or desires) and guided by a belief (or beliefs). With these definitions in place we are ready to address the problem of faith.

Alternatives to Faith as Belief

In this study I assume the traditional Christian position that a response to God in faith is requisite for salvation. If faith is mainly, or solely, belief, and belief is involuntary, then a morally objectionable consequence follows: people are held accountable for involuntary mental states. If we are to reject this consequence then we must admit some other content to the concept of faith. I will now begin to suggest alternatives, beginning with “faith as trust.”

Faith as Trust

Martin Luther put forth “trust” as an alternative to mere “belief” at the time of the Reformation. Luther’s faith as trust adequately answers the objection raised in James chapter two, where even demons are said to have belief in God. Luther, like many others, stressed that faith cannot be mere belief that God exists. Faith is a trust in God. While this conception of faith is certainly superior to a mere belief that God exists, it does not adequately address our problem. Ultimately the concept of trust is purely notional in content. Trust is merely a specific type of belief, namely the belief that one can depend upon a person or thing. Trust in God may have more devotional cache when compared to mere belief in God’s existence; however, trust does not advance a person one iota beyond purely notional belief. Hence the volitional problem we have already outlined remains.

I will end the post here. Next week I will outline some stronger alternatives to faith as mere belief, including one that I think solves our volitional problem.

Until then . . . peace.