Faith Part III: Strong Alternatives

In the past few weeks I have introduced the volitional problem concerning faith, done some preliminary definitional work (concerning belief and action) and outlined a popular alternative to “faith as belief” which is “faith as trust.” As I mentioned last week “faith as trust” still does not really mitigate the volitional problem since trust is simply a special kind of belief. If we are to move beyond the volitional problem (i.e. If faith is belief, and belief is voluntary, it would seem God holds people accountable for an involuntary mental state) then we will need to construct a conception of faith which lessens or eliminates the non-volitional belief content requisite. Below I will offer a few more promising alternatives to “faith as belief.”

B. Faith as Hope

Louis Pojman has suggested that “hope” might serve as a substitute for belief. Pojman observes that many people desire to believe that God exists but cannot will themselves into such a state. This is the heart of our problem. If faith is equated with belief that God exists or belief that Jesus is God’s son, then it seems that the non-believer (or anyone) has little choice in attaining faith. Pojman’s alternative to belief offers such people a more volitional option. His concept of faith as hope is clarified in returning to our horse racing example (see last weeks post for the example’s introduction).


Let us suppose that Climacus is at the track again and that he has the same belief that Santa’s Little Helper is a 10 to 1 underdog in the seventh race. However, in this scenario, the official odds on Santa’s Little Helper are actually 100 to 1. Let us also suppose that Climacus has an extremely strong desire to attend a top culinary program, but he needs a $1000 tuition deposit by tomorrow in order to do so. His desire is so strong it would be a grave tragedy for him to wait another year in order to raise the money requisite for the deposit. Climacus has $10 in his pocket. Other than betting on Santa’s Little Helper, there is no other conceivable way to obtain the deposit in time. As the seventh race approaches, what do you suppose Climacus does?
It is not hard to predict that Climacus will risk his relatively unimportant $10 for the chance to gain admittance to the culinary program. But why would he do this? If we asked Climacus if he believed that Santa’s Little Helper would win, he would most certainly reply “no” (assuming our prior definition of belief). In fact, Climacus has a strong belief that Santa’s Little Helper will lose. Climacus places the bet while strongly believing that he will fail in his efforts. This action is not irrational or unpredictable when one takes into account Climacus’ strong desires. Remember, actions are only guided by beliefs, they are motivated by desires. Climacus is acting on his extremely strong desire to enter into the culinary program. Pojman characterizes this type of action as hope.

Pojman stipulates four qualifications for faith as hope. (1) For one to have hope in a state of affairs there must be at least a slim possibility of that state of affairs obtaining. I cannot hope to draw a square circle because such an action is impossible. (2) Hope precludes certainty; there must be at least some chance of failure. The probability for a state of affairs that is the object of hope must be between 0 and 1. (3) Hope involves at least some desire that a state of affairs obtain. (4) All this implies that one will be disposed to do what one can in order to bring about the state of affairs which is the object of hope.

Climacus’ bet at the track can be characterized by hope. Santa’s Little Helper had some chance of winning, but he was far from a certain bet. With this objective improbability pervading, Climacus acted on his great desire to do the only thing he could to bring about his hoped for state of affairs. He bet his $10 in hope of gaining the necessary $1000. Pojman presents this scenario as a possibility for the person of faith who lacks certain beliefs.

C. Faith as Hope and Acting ‘as if’

For the purpose of evaluating Pojman’s project we will work with the traditional Christian belief: Jesus of Nazareth was God incarnate (henceforth, [J]). Now if a non-Christian could come to believe [J] many other beliefs necessary for the Christian life would fall into place, such as a belief that one should follow the teachings and example of Jesus. We will refer to these beliefs as action, or [A] beliefs. Given the right desires (i.e. the desire to please God), [A] beliefs will probably lead to characteristically Christian actions. Although Pojman, if pressed, would admit that some beliefs are necessary for faith, in outlining faith as hope, he is denying that beliefs akin to [J] are requisite for faith. Strictly speaking, if Pojman’s characterization of faith as hope is valid, one need not believe that [J] in order to exercise Christian faith. However, this does not eliminate all notional content requisite for Christian faith. Pojman has eliminated the need for strong beliefs such as [J] but his concept of faith as hope still requires two lesser notional commitments.

The first lesser, but necessary, belief is a belief that is similar but not identical to [A], let us call it [A’]. The belief [A’] runs as follows: If [J], then I should follow Jesus’ teachings and example. This belief is actually implicit in the person who believes [J] and [A], but it is a much weaker, and therefore a much less controversial claim. My guess is that even most atheists hold to [A’]. The second lesser, but necessary belief, let us call it [S], runs as follows: acting as if [J] is true is my best shot at achieving my ultimate desires. Here, “ultimate desires” may refer to a variety of deeply felt wants depending on the specific context of the person.
A drug addict may have an ultimate desire to be free of her addiction. Someone else may have a more theologically reflective desire for eternal happiness. Still another person may have an ultimate desire to perfectly fulfill the moral law. There are many candidates for an “ultimate desire” but there are at least two clear constraints on such desires. First, ultimate desires cannot be grossly contrary to the morality of Jesus. It would be odd if someone could act in genuine faith in order to achieve an elaborate murder. Second, the person in question must not believe that they can achieve their ultimate desire on their own. Ultimate desires are, by definition, desires which make you feel your own inadequacy or insufficiency (whether perceived or real) with respect to a specific project.

D. Faith as Existential Trust

With these alternatives to “faith as belief” in play we are prepared to bring the conceptual threads together in a robust, yet more inclusive, model of Christian faith. First we will return to trust.

Luther’s concept of “faith as trust” has great potential, but in order to be useful, it must be brought out of the purely notional realm. If faith is something one can be held ultimately accountable for, it must be voluntary; which means it requires some action oriented content. Let me suggest that Christian faith should be characterized as existential trust. This is a form of trust, but the stress lies on the action and not the notional belief. An example will clarify.

Let us suppose I am sitting in my philosophy of religion class looking out of a three storey window at a large tree. There is a moderately sized branch a few feet from the window. Looking to shake things up a bit I exclaim, “I think that branch outside the window would hold me up just fine.” A cheeky individual opens up the window and replies, “Then why don’t you jump out onto it?” Here is where the distinction of existential trust comes into play.

There are two reasons that I might not jump out of the window onto the branch. First, I might not actually believe that the branch can hold my weight. In that case I do not have even a notional trust in the branch. My earlier assertion was an empty bluff. Perhaps upon considering the prospect of jumping out of the window, I realize this lack of notional trust for the first time. Second, I might have a genuine notional trust of the branch’s integrity, but I may lack a sufficiently strong desire (or any desire for that matter) to jump out of the window to test it. Perhaps there is no real gain in the action beyond me verifying my claim. I trust the branch fairly strongly, but I am not certain it will hold my weight. The small risk of falling three storeys outweighs the potential reward of proving my assertion correct. Thus, while I do have genuine notional trust, I still refrain from action. The act of getting up and jumping out of the window onto the branch is an act of existential trust. It is a trust with the accent on actions, not on beliefs. In fact, existential trust has the odd feature that one may exercise it without possessing a genuine notional trust. Although my act could very well be guided by a strong or moderate trust in the branch’s integrity, if I possess certain strong desires, a notional trust is not requisite for action. I may believe that the branch has only a 10% probability of holding me up; yet my desire to prove myself right, or look courageous, may be so strong that I jump out of the window anyway. In this case you could say that I lack notional trust (indeed I think it 90% likely that the branch will break under my weight) but that I exercise existential trust. This conception of faith as existential trust has some obvious affinity for faith as hope and faith as acting ‘as if’.

In jumping out of the window onto the branch in existential trust, I am acting in hope and I am acting ‘as if’ the branch will hold my weight. One major strength of faith as existential trust is that it is quite inclusive. One can act in hope, ‘as if’ something were true, whether one believes a proposition to be nearly certain or nearly impossible. The object of hope must only be less than certain and at least possible. Under this model a person may exercise genuine faith by acting as if [J], which only implies the much lesser belief [A’]. Under this model the stress is put on the action and not the notional content of faith. Although some notional content is requisite, it is minimal, well short of [J] or beliefs akin to [J]. Strictly speaking one may act in faith, acting in hope ‘as if’ Jesus is God incarnate and ‘as if’ God is trustworthy, without even believing ‘that’ Jesus is God incarnate and ‘that’ God is trustworthy. Faith as existential trust has this odd, but appropriate consequence: one can strongly believe in the nonexistence of God, and still exercise faith in Him. This is possible due to the motivating force of an ultimate desire and the guidance of the minimal belief structure of [A’] and [S].

At this point I am guessing that many Christians of various flavors will have some objections. Feel free to raise them in the comments section. Next week I will raise, and answer, what I think are the two most formidable objections to this conception of faith.

Until next week . . . peace.