Faith Part IV: First Objection to Faith as Existential Trust

Last week I finished discussing alternatives to “faith as belief” by presenting the strongest (and I believe correct) notion of faith: faith as existential trust. This is a faith with stress upon action and not upon notional belief. This conception of faith goes a long way in solving our original problem (concerning salvation via involuntary beliefs) but two formidable objections remain. This week I will raise and answer one. Next week I will raise and answer a final objection and thus conclude our foray into the world of faith.

A. Objection: Belief Snuck in the Back Door-

A major strength of faith as existential trust is that it does not require people to will themselves to believe that God exists, or that Jesus is God incarnate or that God is trustworthy. It requires much more modest notional content, namely: if God exists and Jesus is God incarnate then I should follow the teachings and example of Jesus and; acting as if Jesus is God incarnate is my best shot at achieving my ultimate purposes. However modest this notional content may be, one may object that faith as existential trust still requires involuntary notional content. People are still going to be held accountable for involuntary beliefs (albeit modest ones). So while the problem has been lessened with this more inclusive concept of faith, it has not been solved completely.
Existential faith still requires beliefs [A’] and [S], and both can be plausibly rejected by a large number of people. This is because, to believe that if [J], then I should follow Jesus’ teachings and example, or that acting as if [J] is true is my best shot at achieving my ultimate desires, one must first have at least a vague notion of [J] . There are millions, if not billions of people on earth who have never heard of Jesus or his teachings. Furthermore, there are many people who have heard of [J], accept [A’] but reject [S] . Often [S] is rejected because of the many faith options in our modern world. It is likely that people who have heard of Jesus and his teachings have also heard of at least one other plausible world religion. Given someone’s noetic structure, Christianity may not strike them as their “best shot”. One could respond that a modern person should perform faith experiments, sampling each viable option. But how long would these experiments take to be valid and how many people would perpetually experiment until death because of the many options offered? Ultimately the experimental option will only be viable for some of the modern people who have encountered Christianity. This leaves the rest of those who have encountered Christianity, and the few billion humans who have never had such an encounter, without any volitional recourse. How should we address these people, for whom explicit faith, even in the form of existential trust, is not an option?

B. Response: Implicit Faith

So far as I can see the only adequate answer to this objection is that there must exist a form of implicit faith that is sufficient for salvation. Ultimately this concept of implicit faith is best worked out in a fuller account of salvation theology; here a brief initial description will suffice. Someone who exercises implicit faith will be the type of person who will respond explicitly (in existential trust) when confronted with the teachings and example of Jesus given that they believe [S]. Such a person would hold belief [M’] which follows: if there is a legitimate higher moral power or authority, then I should obey it. This is an uncontroversial claim that even a staunch moral skeptic would accept. This minimal belief guides the person of implicit faith. They act according to their best approximation of what the moral law might be if a moral authority exists. This type of implicit faith could apply to someone who has never encountered Christianity, but it can also apply to the skeptic who has encountered the teachings of Jesus, accepts [A’] but rejects [S]. Given belief [S] they would exercise explicit faith, but since they cannot bring themselves to believe [S] they may exercise implicit faith by holding to belief [M’]. It is important to note that the driving force behind any faith (explicit or implicit) is desire. One must act on a desire to do what one should do, given your beliefs. Genuine faith and salvation status is not determined by belief, but by action. One is held accountable for what one decides to do given one’s beliefs. The decision of faith is a choice, not between beliefs, but between various actions aimed at satisfying competing desires.

This description of faith should lead into another, perhaps more common, objection concerning works righteousness. Next week I will state and address that objection and conclude our musings on the nature of faith.
Until next week . . . peace.