Sunday, March 28, 2010

Faith Part III: Strong Alternatives

In the past few weeks I have introduced the volitional problem concerning faith, done some preliminary definitional work (concerning belief and action) and outlined a popular alternative to “faith as belief” which is “faith as trust.” As I mentioned last week “faith as trust” still does not really mitigate the volitional problem since trust is simply a special kind of belief. If we are to move beyond the volitional problem (i.e. If faith is belief, and belief is voluntary, it would seem God holds people accountable for an involuntary mental state) then we will need to construct a conception of faith which lessens or eliminates the non-volitional belief content requisite. Below I will offer a few more promising alternatives to “faith as belief.”

B. Faith as Hope

Louis Pojman has suggested that “hope” might serve as a substitute for belief. Pojman observes that many people desire to believe that God exists but cannot will themselves into such a state. This is the heart of our problem. If faith is equated with belief that God exists or belief that Jesus is God’s son, then it seems that the non-believer (or anyone) has little choice in attaining faith. Pojman’s alternative to belief offers such people a more volitional option. His concept of faith as hope is clarified in returning to our horse racing example (see last weeks post for the example’s introduction).


Let us suppose that Climacus is at the track again and that he has the same belief that Santa’s Little Helper is a 10 to 1 underdog in the seventh race. However, in this scenario, the official odds on Santa’s Little Helper are actually 100 to 1. Let us also suppose that Climacus has an extremely strong desire to attend a top culinary program, but he needs a $1000 tuition deposit by tomorrow in order to do so. His desire is so strong it would be a grave tragedy for him to wait another year in order to raise the money requisite for the deposit. Climacus has $10 in his pocket. Other than betting on Santa’s Little Helper, there is no other conceivable way to obtain the deposit in time. As the seventh race approaches, what do you suppose Climacus does?
It is not hard to predict that Climacus will risk his relatively unimportant $10 for the chance to gain admittance to the culinary program. But why would he do this? If we asked Climacus if he believed that Santa’s Little Helper would win, he would most certainly reply “no” (assuming our prior definition of belief). In fact, Climacus has a strong belief that Santa’s Little Helper will lose. Climacus places the bet while strongly believing that he will fail in his efforts. This action is not irrational or unpredictable when one takes into account Climacus’ strong desires. Remember, actions are only guided by beliefs, they are motivated by desires. Climacus is acting on his extremely strong desire to enter into the culinary program. Pojman characterizes this type of action as hope.

Pojman stipulates four qualifications for faith as hope. (1) For one to have hope in a state of affairs there must be at least a slim possibility of that state of affairs obtaining. I cannot hope to draw a square circle because such an action is impossible. (2) Hope precludes certainty; there must be at least some chance of failure. The probability for a state of affairs that is the object of hope must be between 0 and 1. (3) Hope involves at least some desire that a state of affairs obtain. (4) All this implies that one will be disposed to do what one can in order to bring about the state of affairs which is the object of hope.

Climacus’ bet at the track can be characterized by hope. Santa’s Little Helper had some chance of winning, but he was far from a certain bet. With this objective improbability pervading, Climacus acted on his great desire to do the only thing he could to bring about his hoped for state of affairs. He bet his $10 in hope of gaining the necessary $1000. Pojman presents this scenario as a possibility for the person of faith who lacks certain beliefs.

C. Faith as Hope and Acting ‘as if’

For the purpose of evaluating Pojman’s project we will work with the traditional Christian belief: Jesus of Nazareth was God incarnate (henceforth, [J]). Now if a non-Christian could come to believe [J] many other beliefs necessary for the Christian life would fall into place, such as a belief that one should follow the teachings and example of Jesus. We will refer to these beliefs as action, or [A] beliefs. Given the right desires (i.e. the desire to please God), [A] beliefs will probably lead to characteristically Christian actions. Although Pojman, if pressed, would admit that some beliefs are necessary for faith, in outlining faith as hope, he is denying that beliefs akin to [J] are requisite for faith. Strictly speaking, if Pojman’s characterization of faith as hope is valid, one need not believe that [J] in order to exercise Christian faith. However, this does not eliminate all notional content requisite for Christian faith. Pojman has eliminated the need for strong beliefs such as [J] but his concept of faith as hope still requires two lesser notional commitments.

The first lesser, but necessary, belief is a belief that is similar but not identical to [A], let us call it [A’]. The belief [A’] runs as follows: If [J], then I should follow Jesus’ teachings and example. This belief is actually implicit in the person who believes [J] and [A], but it is a much weaker, and therefore a much less controversial claim. My guess is that even most atheists hold to [A’]. The second lesser, but necessary belief, let us call it [S], runs as follows: acting as if [J] is true is my best shot at achieving my ultimate desires. Here, “ultimate desires” may refer to a variety of deeply felt wants depending on the specific context of the person.
A drug addict may have an ultimate desire to be free of her addiction. Someone else may have a more theologically reflective desire for eternal happiness. Still another person may have an ultimate desire to perfectly fulfill the moral law. There are many candidates for an “ultimate desire” but there are at least two clear constraints on such desires. First, ultimate desires cannot be grossly contrary to the morality of Jesus. It would be odd if someone could act in genuine faith in order to achieve an elaborate murder. Second, the person in question must not believe that they can achieve their ultimate desire on their own. Ultimate desires are, by definition, desires which make you feel your own inadequacy or insufficiency (whether perceived or real) with respect to a specific project.

D. Faith as Existential Trust

With these alternatives to “faith as belief” in play we are prepared to bring the conceptual threads together in a robust, yet more inclusive, model of Christian faith. First we will return to trust.

Luther’s concept of “faith as trust” has great potential, but in order to be useful, it must be brought out of the purely notional realm. If faith is something one can be held ultimately accountable for, it must be voluntary; which means it requires some action oriented content. Let me suggest that Christian faith should be characterized as existential trust. This is a form of trust, but the stress lies on the action and not the notional belief. An example will clarify.

Let us suppose I am sitting in my philosophy of religion class looking out of a three storey window at a large tree. There is a moderately sized branch a few feet from the window. Looking to shake things up a bit I exclaim, “I think that branch outside the window would hold me up just fine.” A cheeky individual opens up the window and replies, “Then why don’t you jump out onto it?” Here is where the distinction of existential trust comes into play.

There are two reasons that I might not jump out of the window onto the branch. First, I might not actually believe that the branch can hold my weight. In that case I do not have even a notional trust in the branch. My earlier assertion was an empty bluff. Perhaps upon considering the prospect of jumping out of the window, I realize this lack of notional trust for the first time. Second, I might have a genuine notional trust of the branch’s integrity, but I may lack a sufficiently strong desire (or any desire for that matter) to jump out of the window to test it. Perhaps there is no real gain in the action beyond me verifying my claim. I trust the branch fairly strongly, but I am not certain it will hold my weight. The small risk of falling three storeys outweighs the potential reward of proving my assertion correct. Thus, while I do have genuine notional trust, I still refrain from action. The act of getting up and jumping out of the window onto the branch is an act of existential trust. It is a trust with the accent on actions, not on beliefs. In fact, existential trust has the odd feature that one may exercise it without possessing a genuine notional trust. Although my act could very well be guided by a strong or moderate trust in the branch’s integrity, if I possess certain strong desires, a notional trust is not requisite for action. I may believe that the branch has only a 10% probability of holding me up; yet my desire to prove myself right, or look courageous, may be so strong that I jump out of the window anyway. In this case you could say that I lack notional trust (indeed I think it 90% likely that the branch will break under my weight) but that I exercise existential trust. This conception of faith as existential trust has some obvious affinity for faith as hope and faith as acting ‘as if’.

In jumping out of the window onto the branch in existential trust, I am acting in hope and I am acting ‘as if’ the branch will hold my weight. One major strength of faith as existential trust is that it is quite inclusive. One can act in hope, ‘as if’ something were true, whether one believes a proposition to be nearly certain or nearly impossible. The object of hope must only be less than certain and at least possible. Under this model a person may exercise genuine faith by acting as if [J], which only implies the much lesser belief [A’]. Under this model the stress is put on the action and not the notional content of faith. Although some notional content is requisite, it is minimal, well short of [J] or beliefs akin to [J]. Strictly speaking one may act in faith, acting in hope ‘as if’ Jesus is God incarnate and ‘as if’ God is trustworthy, without even believing ‘that’ Jesus is God incarnate and ‘that’ God is trustworthy. Faith as existential trust has this odd, but appropriate consequence: one can strongly believe in the nonexistence of God, and still exercise faith in Him. This is possible due to the motivating force of an ultimate desire and the guidance of the minimal belief structure of [A’] and [S].

At this point I am guessing that many Christians of various flavors will have some objections. Feel free to raise them in the comments section. Next week I will raise, and answer, what I think are the two most formidable objections to this conception of faith.

Until next week . . . peace.

Wednesday, March 24, 2010

Faith Part II: Definitions and the Alternative of “Faith as Trust”

Last week I introduced the chief problem with conceiving of faith as mere belief. Essentially it boils down to this: faith is volitional (it is a decision) and belief (in large part) is not. Faced with this dilemma one has two options, either: (a) redefine faith in a more volitional manner or (b) retain the definition of faith as belief and admit that faith is not volitional (and that we are held eternally accountable for a “decision” we have no control over).

Faced with this dilemma I have chosen option (b) and will begin pursuing it below. Towards the end of this post I will begin to introduce alternatives to “faith as belief,” but first it is necessary to do some preliminary definitional work.

Definitions and The Humean Model of Action

Language surrounding faith is often multivalent. In order to discuss faith and its components productively it is essential to start with clear definitions. For the purposes of this study the term “belief” will refer to a confidence in the truth of a proposition. Unless otherwise stated, belief will always refer to “belief that” something is true (i.e. corresponds to reality). A belief need not be certain, but it must be more probable than not. To believe that something is true is to think that there is greater than 0.5 (or 50%) probability that it is the case. A brief example will clarify.

Let us suppose that Climacus is at the race track and has two beliefs. Climacus believes that the horses will run today and also that ‘Santa’s Little Helper’ is a 10 to 1 underdog in the seventh race. Climacus’ belief that the horses will run today is fairly straightforward; it has a high probability. Barring a freak electrical storm, the horses will be running. His belief that “Santa’s Little Helper” is a 10 to 1 underdog is not as simple. Strictly speaking, Climacus does not have a ‘10% belief’ that Santa’s Little Helper will win’. Such a low probability belief would be no belief at all. In this case Climacus has a belief that the odds on Santa’s Little Helper are accurate. Let us assume he knows the odds makers and thinks that they are both trustworthy and knowledgeable. Thus, Climacus does not have a belief that Santa’s Little Helper will win, but he does have a moderately strong belief that the odds are accurate.

With this concept of belief in mind we can move to the definition of an action. I will use the Humean model of action, which follows:

Desire + Belief = Action

In this model, desire is analogous to an engine and belief is akin to a steering mechanism. Desire motivates an action (it is a want for some as yet unobtained end), while belief (or beliefs) determines what steps an agent takes to achieve her desired end. It is clear that both elements must be present for an action to follow. I may have a belief that a tree will fall on my house if I chop it down; however, an action will not follow in this case because I have no desire to ruin my roof. Conversely, I may have a desire to fly without mechanical aide, but this desire will not incite me to flap my arms. This is because I have no belief that such flight is possible. An action is a volitional movement motivated by a desire (or desires) and guided by a belief (or beliefs). With these definitions in place we are ready to address the problem of faith.

Alternatives to Faith as Belief

In this study I assume the traditional Christian position that a response to God in faith is requisite for salvation. If faith is mainly, or solely, belief, and belief is involuntary, then a morally objectionable consequence follows: people are held accountable for involuntary mental states. If we are to reject this consequence then we must admit some other content to the concept of faith. I will now begin to suggest alternatives, beginning with “faith as trust.”

Faith as Trust

Martin Luther put forth “trust” as an alternative to mere “belief” at the time of the Reformation. Luther’s faith as trust adequately answers the objection raised in James chapter two, where even demons are said to have belief in God. Luther, like many others, stressed that faith cannot be mere belief that God exists. Faith is a trust in God. While this conception of faith is certainly superior to a mere belief that God exists, it does not adequately address our problem. Ultimately the concept of trust is purely notional in content. Trust is merely a specific type of belief, namely the belief that one can depend upon a person or thing. Trust in God may have more devotional cache when compared to mere belief in God’s existence; however, trust does not advance a person one iota beyond purely notional belief. Hence the volitional problem we have already outlined remains.

I will end the post here. Next week I will outline some stronger alternatives to faith as mere belief, including one that I think solves our volitional problem.

Until then . . . peace.

Wednesday, March 17, 2010

Faith Part I: The Problem

In a way I am jumping the gun. If one wishes to keep a strict chronological approach in relating the ordo salutis (order of salvation, or the ordering of the steps in the process of salvation) then one needs to begin with grace. Indeed the oft repeated reformation mantra sola fide is inaccurate and does not really get at the meat of what the reformer Luther wanted to say. If we had to center on one element the correct mantra for salvation would be sola gratia (grace alone). If we allow two elements in our description of salvation, then, and only then, does faith come into the picture. Salvation is by grace through faith. In other words, the main emphasis in salvation is on God’s grace and He has arranged things so that this grace is salvific when appropriated through faith. Nothing of what I have just said should be controversial to an orthodox Christian. Protestants as well as Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox should be able to agree at least upon this (it is the exact nature of this appropriation of grace that is the bone of contention).

So, why am I starting in the middle, with faith, and not beginning with the true foundation of salvation: grace? Well, for starters, faith is often so misunderstood. This is especially true in Protestant circles. But beyond this, a right understanding of faith can crack open salvation theology and an inadequate understanding can stall even the most eloquent ordo salutis. For good or for ill, a person’s understanding of faith will color nearly every other element of their paradigm of salvation. And for ill (not good) issues surrounding faith have been the largest divider of Protestants and high church traditions. Although neither side is without blame, I have found Protestants to harbor particularly incoherent and inaccurate views of just what faith is. The great thing is, a lot of these issues can be cleared up with just a little dabble into philosophy (really just a little dabble into common sense once philosophy has done the preparatory analytical work). My goal then, is to show how Protestants and high church traditions alike can come together on the nature of faith. I will do this through a careful analysis of just what faith is and how it works within the economy of salvation (or within: how salvation is actually worked out). But before we get to the nature faith and its place in salvation theology, we must first delineate what faith is not. And in order to do this we must begin with a problem.

The Problem: Faith is a Choice, Belief is Not

What could be simpler than salvation by grace through faith? Where exactly is the problem? The problem arises when we consider some common conceptions of what faith is in concert with what philosophy (or just some common sense reflection) reveals.

Salvation begins with God’s grace. Historically, Christians have maintained that in order to be efficacious, this offer of grace must be accepted in faith. Hence, the common Christian belief that salvation is by grace through faith. It has also been commonly assumed that this faith is a choice. In other words, a person can either reject or accept God’s salvific grace. So far, so good.

Naturally the question arises, “What is the nature of this faith decision?” The traditional answer has been that one chooses to believe when one exercises the decision of faith. However, taken in the modern, purely notional sense, mere belief appears to be inadequate to account for the content of a faith decision. A decision is volitional by definition, but recent philosophy has concluded that belief, for the most part, is an involuntary state. Just think about it for a moment and you will realize by virtue of common sense what philosophers have labored in analytical detail to prove. Suppose, for example, that I see a basket of fruit before me on a table full of apples and oranges. If I actually look at the table (and my eyes and brain are working properly) I will involuntarily form a belief that I am seeing a basket of fruit. I cannot simply decide to not believe that I am seeing a basket of fruit. Nor is it as if I say to myself, “hmmm, do I wish to believe that I am seeing this basket of fruit? Yes, yes I do. I think I will form that belief . . . now!” The same thing applies to other less obvious beliefs.

For example, let us say that you ask your spouse to wash the dishes. You come home and they are not washed. Your spouse tells you that she (or he) forgot. Now you will form one of two beliefs: either they are telling you the truth, in which case they really forgot; or they are lying, in which case they purposefully avoided the chore for some reason. You will have a bunch of evidence at your disposal in order to form a belief. You probably have some sense of how honest your spouse is and if they have ever lied to you before. You can read the body language of your spouse to detect the truthfulness of her (or his) statement. You may take into account if your spouse is particularly lazy, or if your spouse often forgets things. At best you may be able to decide not to consider all or any of the evidence. However, once you do consider the evidence you do not have a choice concerning belief formation. You will simply form a belief based on the evidence automatically and involuntarily. You cannot choose to believe the truthfulness of your spouse anymore than you can choose to believe that you are seeing a basket of fruit. You simply either believe it or you do not.

Here is where the problem arises. Most Christians, indeed most people in general, have assumed that one cannot be held accountable for an involuntary act or mental state. Thus, a tension results between a faith that is assumed to be volitional and a faith that is assumed to be primarily (or solely) notional (i.e. solely belief in content). One assumption will have to be relinquished: either faith is not volitional (and people are saved/condemned based on an involuntary belief) or faith is volitional and not primarily or merely notional (about belief).

A Way Forward

So this is the problem as it stands. In a few short paragraphs I have shown why “faith as belief” (at least belief in the modern, purely notional sense) is inadequate. Some Christians may go their entire lives without realizing this, and that is fine. I do not think you need to know the exact philosophical nature of faith in order to exercise it in a salvific fashion. However, this conception of faith is incoherent (upon careful consideration) and has led to some judgment of other Christians (especially the high church variety). In the coming weeks I will attempt to identify and evaluate some alternatives to this view of faith. Ultimately, I hope to construct a robust vision of Christian faith that stresses its active-volitional nature while downplaying the notional (belief oriented) content. It is this notion of faith that I feel, when properly understood, has great potential to bring Protestants and high church traditions together on issues concerning salvation theology.

Until next week . . . peace.

Monday, March 8, 2010

Salvation: The Big Picture

I now wish to begin a series of posts on salvation theology. Before I delve into any of the specifics; I first want to give a broad overview of what salvation is. In brief, one could sum up salvation by saying that it begins and ends with the Trinity.

The Beginning of Salvation: The Trinity

Before anything was created there existed the Triune God from all eternity. For all eternity the persons of the Trinity gave and received love in a differentiated but united community. One God in three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God did not need to create humanity or anything else, so that He might have something to do or someone to love. He was completely fulfilled in His eternal communion of love.

However, that communion of love did overflow into creation, including human creation. Unfortunately human creation fell. It is clear enough form everyday experience that we all have fallen short of the moral law. Most essentially, we have fallen short in love: we have not loved God or others as we should have. As a result of this Sin, we are not in right relationship with the Trinity.

Salvation is God bringing us back into the life of the Trinity.

Let me repeat that. Salvation is GOD bringing us back into the life of the Trinity. God is salvation’s initiator, and it is to the Triune God that salvation aims as its end. Salvation is not our prerogative and it is not our achievement. The entirety of the Scriptural narrative can be read as God seeking to bring humanity back into the life of the Trinity (and humanity resisting nearly every step of the way). In fact, there was only one distinct point where humanity did not resist salvation at all: Jesus Christ. It is through Christ that we have a way to God.

What does it mean to come back into the life of the Trinity?

The special status of Christ makes Him the key to salvation. He is quite literally the only way we can be brought back into the life of the Trinity. In subsequent posts I will strive to lay out the specifics of how we can enter into the life of the Trinity through the mediation of the Son by the power of the Holy Spirit. These specifics will include the nature of faith (both explicit and implicit), justification and sanctification among other things. For now this pithy summary will set forth the parameters of the discussion:

Salvation is entering into the life of the Trinity. This means coming back into right relationship with the Father, by being united to the body of Christ, through the power of the Holy Spirit.

Next week: the nature of saving faith. Until then . . . peace.